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INDIANA’S COLLATERAL SOURCE ACT:  
CONFUSING COURTS AND UNDERMINING 
THE SUBROGATION RIGHTS OF WORKER’S 
COMPENSATION CARRIERS ONE 
INTERPRETATION AT A TIME 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Worker’s compensation was developed during the height of the 
Industrial Revolution to counteract the devastating effects from 
frequently occurring workplace injuries, and to protect employers from 
crippling civil judgments.1  Worker’s compensation benefits both injured 
workers and employers by alleviating the tort system’s potential for a 
financially devastating damages award.2  In doing so, the system 
establishes a beneficial trade-off for employees and employers in the 
event of an on-the-job injury, resulting in decreased litigation costs and 
improved judicial efficiency.3 
Every state requires all employees and employers to follow the 
state’s specific worker’s compensation requirements.4  Since worker’s 
compensation imposes limitations on recovery for injured employees, 
states have allowed injured parties to pursue third-party actions for 
other damages.5  To reduce double recovery risks and reimburse carriers, 
all fifty states now provide carriers with subrogation rights.6  Essentially, 
subrogation rights allow a worker’s compensation carrier who has 
extended benefits to an injured employee to stand in the shoes of the 
employee and be reimbursed by the negligent party for any incurred 
costs.7  This stand-in method prevents double recovery by eliminating 
                                                 
1 See infra Part II.A (noting that before the advent of worker’s compensation, both the 
employer and the employee were greatly harmed in the event of a workplace injury). 
2 See infra Part II.A (discussing that a single civil judgment, even though rare, could 
financially devastate an employer). 
3 See infra Part II.A (discussing that the state legislatures wanted a benefits program that 
was faster than Social Security or Medicare). 
4 See infra Part II.A (demonstrating that worker’s compensation claims must be brought 
before the Workmen’s Compensation Board, which is overseen by the state pursuant to 
Indiana Code section 22-3-2-6); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (West 2005) (discussing 
the process and function of the Workmen’s Compensation Board in Indiana). 
5 See infra Part II.B (explaining how subrogation allows carriers who supply worker’s 
compensation benefits to injured parties to recoup those losses). 
6 See infra Part II.B (explaining the statutes’ purpose is to prevent double recovery and 
protect the carriers’ interests); see also infra notes 27, 31 (explaining the various state 
subrogation statutes and the priorities they respectively give the interested parties in 
worker’s compensation cases). 
7 See infra Part II.B (discussing how subrogation operates to reimburse the employer or 
carrier, whomever is the payer of the worker’s compensation benefits). 
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the risk that the jury’s award will include costs already received in 
worker’s compensation benefits.8 
The rise in health care costs and desire to abolish frivolous lawsuits 
has triggered a recent tort reform movement, which has a dangerous 
effect on the subrogation rights of carriers.9  In response to the 
movement, states, like Indiana, have changed their collateral source 
statutes through abrogation.10  Abrogation allows evidence of certain 
third-party benefit payments to be introduced at trial.11  Collateral source 
abrogation varies across the states and often influences subrogation 
rights.12  The main purpose behind abrogation is to prevent meritless 
lawsuits by eliminating the chance of double recovery by plaintiffs.13  
Some states, like Indiana, have abrogated the collateral source rule for 
worker’s compensation payments.14  However, the ambiguous language 
in Indiana’s collateral source statute leaves award allocation and jury 
intent extremely difficult to ascertain.15  The statute’s nebulous language 
affords plaintiffs double recoveries, undermines the tort reform 
movement’s purpose, and costs Indiana businesses millions in 
unnecessary litigation expenses and damages.16 
Part II of this Note details the history and development of worker’s 
compensation law and subrogation rights for carriers.17  Part II also 
explains the history of tort reform and its impact on the collateral source 
rule.18  Next, Part III analyzes the present problems with the ambiguous 
                                                 
8 See infra Part II.B (clarifying how subrogation prevents double recovery); see also Parts 
II.A.1, II.B.1 (explaining the courts’ interpretations of the various subrogation statutes and 
noting the “strong policy against double recovery” (quoting Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass 
Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)). 
9 See infra Part II.D (noting that the development of tort reform was to address frivolous 
lawsuits for medical malpractice). 
10 See infra Part II.D (explaining the various state approaches to abrogating their 
collateral source statutes and the purposes for such abrogation). 
11 See infra Part II.D (discussing the onslaught of abrogation across the nation and the 
different approaches taken by the various states). 
12 See infra Part II.D (explaining how there is no consistency across the states in the 
abrogation of collateral source statutes). 
13 See infra Part II.B (explaining that the chance of double recovery can entice plaintiffs to 
file frivolous lawsuits to receive money that would not otherwise be owed to them). 
14 See infra Part II.D (detailing the states’ various approaches to abrogation). 
15 See infra Part III.B (explaining that the ambiguous language in the collateral source 
statute undermines the purpose of subrogation). 
16 See infra Part III (explaining that the interpretations the courts are left to make are 
often subjective and detrimental to the carriers). 
17 See infra Part II.A (describing the developments of worker’s compensation system and 
the advent of subrogation rights to further the system’s purpose). 
18 See infra Part II.B (detailing the advent of the tort reform movement in the wake of the 
healthcare crises and how this movement has impacted the collateral source rule across the 
country). 
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language of Indiana’s collateral source statute.19  Finally, Part IV will 
propose that the Collateral Source Act, if reformed at all in the context of 
worker’s compensation payments, be amended to mandate that benefit 
payments are included in the damages award.20  Either a reversion to the 
common law collateral source rule or the proposed amendment would 
eliminate the risk of depriving carriers of their statutorily enumerated 
lien rights, prevent jury confusion, and eradicate the risk of contradicting 
the Act’s own purpose.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This Part explains the development of worker’s compensation law, 
the tort reform movement, and the drastic effect the recent comingling of 
the two areas of law has had on the statutorily enumerated rights of 
worker’s compensation carriers.  First, Part II.A explores the 
development and purpose of the worker’s compensation system with an 
analysis of recent trends.22  Second Part II.B discusses the reasoning 
employed by various state legislatures when applying subrogation and 
lien rights.  Third, Part II.C details the tort reform movement to abolish 
the collateral source rule.23  Part II.C also explains the states’ various 
attempts, both failed and successful, to abolish the rule.24  Finally, Part 
II.D explores how these two areas of law have recently begun to overlap 
and explains how this new phenomenon affects subrogation rights in 
Indiana.25  Part II.D further explains other states’ approaches in this area 
with an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of the risks of 
improper abrogation.26 
                                                 
19 See infra Part III (discussing how the courts will have proper direction in deciding 
worker’s compensation subrogation cases only when the intent of the legislature is clear). 
20 See infra Part IV (noting that the problems facing present and future litigants and the 
judicial system face can be eliminated with the proposed amendment). 
21 See infra Part IV (explaining that the proposed amendment would give clear guidance 
to courts, which is currently lacking). 
22 See infra Part II.A (describing how cost and claims trends have changed recently due 
to the current recession). 
23 See infra Part II.C (explaining that the tort reform movement was initiated to reduce 
costs and the onslaught of frivolous lawsuits triggered by the rising costs in the health care 
industry). 
24 See infra Part II.C (explaining how some of the state’s abrogated collateral source 
statutes have been found unconstitutional). 
25 See infra Part II.D (detailing how worker’s compensation carriers’ subrogation rights 
have been affected by the tort reform movement). 
26 See infra Part II.D (discussing how the Supreme Court has recommended that 
procedures be outlined by the states to ensure the juries do not misapply damage awards). 
Kauther: Indiana's Collateral Source Act:  Confusing Courts and Underminin
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
1142 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
A. History and Development of Worker’s Compensation 
The deplorable and treacherous working conditions of the 
nineteenth century climaxed during the peak of the Industrial 
Revolution.27  Due to hazardous working conditions, states developed 
worker’s compensation as the solution, with the underlying motivation 
to protect employers from costly civil judgments and reimburse 
employees for lost wages and medical expenses.28  Following England’s 
example, the United States enacted the Federal Employment 
Compensation Act in 1908, providing disability benefits for federal 
employees.29  In 1911, Wisconsin became the first state to develop its own 
                                                 
27 GARY L. WICKERT, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SUBROGATION IN ALL 50 STATES 1–2 (3d 
ed. 2007); see also MARGARET C. JASPER, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW 1–3 (2d ed. 2008) 
(outlining the development and purpose of the worker’s compensation system).  
Treacherous conditions were experienced by workers in every industry during this time 
period as explained below: 
[T]he depressing story is almost unchanged from the handloom 
weaver and framework knitter of the 1830s and 40s to the nailmaker 
and needlewoman of the 1880s and 1890s.  It appears, then, that 
whether a worker was employed in a textile factory (the most extreme 
case) or in a small workshop, he suffered a marked deterioration in his 
life at work—the obvious consequence of the quickening pace of 
industrialization. 
Eric Hopkins, Working Hours and Conditions During the Industrial Revolution:  A Re-Appraisal, 
35 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 52 (1982). 
28 WICKERT, supra note 27, at 1–5.  Although civil litigation during the Industrial 
Revolution favored employers, when the employee did win, there was a good chance it 
would cause the employer to go bankrupt.  See RAYMOND HOGLER, EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:  LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 80–83 (2004) (explaining 
why employers supported worker’s compensation programs even though employees often 
lost common law personal injury suits). 
29 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101–8193 (2006).  As the industrial revolution grew, so did the occurrence 
of workplace injuries, and the present common law rules governing employment could not 
deal with this sharp rise in injured workers.  HOGLER, supra note 28, at 83.  As these 
problems arose, U.S. judges and legislatures looked to England, which had developed a 
similar system to address these issues.  Id.  However, under the English rule, an employee 
had to prove that the employer’s negligence caused the injury, but the rule ultimately 
codified by the United States did not require negligence to recover.  Id. at 84. 
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worker’s compensation program.30  By 1949, all fifty states had 
established their own programs.31 
The development of worker’s compensation is unique in several 
respects.32  First, the worker’s compensation systems are developed and 
run by the states, not the federal government.33  Second, employers 
advocated for the development of worker’s compensation despite the 
previously favorable common law remedies.34  Before the worker’s 
compensation scheme, the courts favored employers and precluded 
employee recovery because of the employer-employee contractual 
relationship.35  Under worker’s compensation, injured employees are 
guaranteed a fixed amount of benefits in exchange for relinquishing their 
ability to sue the employer.36 
                                                 
30 Betsy J. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief:  A Proposal for a Permanent 
Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9 N.Y.U J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 706 
n.221 (2005); see Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209, 215 (Wis. 1911) (sustaining the state’s 
organic compensation scheme that foreclosed employer common law defenses); Peter 
Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 730 (1992) (noting that many 
states quickly followed Wisconsin’s lead, with “all but eight American states” enacting 
worker’s compensation statutes by the 1920s). 
31 JASPER, supra note 27, at 2.  The author explains that the state statutes vary 
significantly in their operation, oversight, and benefit provisions.  See generally id. 
(reviewing variations in worker’s compensation statutes). 
32 HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80.  The author explains several reasons why the system is 
unique, foremost being that it seems to contradict the best interests of the employer.  Id. at 
80–84. 
33 HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80.  The system of recovery is entirely determined by the 
respective state and not overseen by the federal government—unlike other forms of 
disability benefits, such as Medicare and Social Security.  Id. at 80–85. 
34 Id. at 80.  The Industrial Age was especially hard on employees because of both the 
deplorable conditions and the employer’s usual immunity in the event of a workplace 
injury.  JOHN JUDE MORAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW:  NEW CHALLENGES IN THE BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT 455 (3d ed. 2005).  The author explains the hardships employees faced: 
During the Industrial Age, many workers labored under the most 
deplorable conditions, such as the lack of heat, lighting, and 
ventilation . . . .  Workers for the most part assumed the risk of injury.  
Recovering damages for loss of earnings, medical expenses, and pain 
and suffering was rare.  The employee suffered not only an injury but 
also the possible loss of his or her job for nonperformance.  Coworkers 
were afraid to testify for fear of employer retaliation.  Even worse than 
that was the courts’ allowance of the legal defenses of fellow servant 
negligence and assumption of risk. 
Id. 
35 See MORAN, supra note 34, at 455 (detailing the limited options of recourse for 
employees during the Industrial Age).  Hogler also details how an employer could contract 
with the employee for immunity in the event of an injury before the development of 
worker’s compensation.  HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80–90. 
36 HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80.  Essentially, the system works as an insurance program 
for the employer, as it pays a premium either to the state fund or private insurance carrier, 
and the insurer decides which claims should be paid at the state-mandated rate.  Id. at 81. 
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As the nation’s earliest tort reform, worker’s compensation replaced 
tort recovery for workplace injuries.37  This system provides for a no-
fault system of recovery for medical expenses and lost wages for injuries 
arising in the scope of one’s employment.38  Worker’s compensation is 
designed to quickly compensate for a wide range of injuries, unlike 
Medicaid, Medicare, or Social Security.39  The manner in which an 
injured employee recovers under worker’s compensation varies by state, 
and is defined by the respective state’s statute.40 
Most states, like Indiana, require employers to carry worker’s 
compensation insurance.41  This mandate makes worker’s compensation 
insurance the largest insurance line in the country.42  Collectively, the 
fifty states’ worker’s compensation systems pay more in support for 
disabled workers than any other source of support, surpassed only by 
Social Security.43  When an injured employee files a successful claim, the 
benefits are paid by the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier, as 
directed by the Workers’ Compensation Board.44  The states’ systems 
outline methods of recovery and payment schedules for different claims 
                                                 
37 Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole:  Tort Law’s Compensatory Failures Through a Wider Lens, 
27 REV. LITIG. 307, 313 (2008) (citing Ishita Sengupta, Virginia Reno & John F. Burton, Jr., 
Workers’ Compensation:  Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 2005, 2007 NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS. 6). 
38 HOGLER, supra note 28, at 80; see id. at 80-81 (explaining that in exchange for worker’s 
compensation benefits, the employer will not be held liable). 
39 See Pryor, supra note 37, at 313 (citing Sengupta, et. al, supra note 37, at 6).  Unlike 
Social Security, worker’s compensation covers short-term wage loss and partial permanent 
disabilities; however, similar to Medicaid, it provides compensation for long-term 
disabilities.  Id.  In 2002, eighty percent of worker’s compensation benefits went to 
permanent injuries or death.  Id. (citing Sengupta et. al, supra note 37, at 7). 
40 WICKERT, supra note 27, at 1.  Some states provide coverage through a Monopolistic 
State Fund.  Id.  These states include North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming.  Id.  Some states have state-run worker’s compensation funds that compete with 
private carriers including Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah.  Id. at 
1–2. 
41 See generally id. at 1–15.  The states that do not mandate private insurance coverage 
usually require the employer to pay into the state fund for worker’s compensation.  Id. 
42 Id. at 2.  “The estimated premiums for 2002 were in excess of $60 billion,” and the 
states with the largest premiums are California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New York, and 
Texas.  Id. 
43 Rudolph L. Rose, Insurance Fraud and Workers’ Compensation, in CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN INSURANCE LAW 2010, at 187, 198 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course 
Handbook Ser. No. 811, 2010).  The worker’s compensation programs in the fifty states, 
combined with federal programs, paid $56 billion in 2004.  Id. 
44 JASPER, supra note 27, at 1–50; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-1-1 (West 2005) 
(explaining the function of Indiana’s state run Workmen’s Compensation Board). 
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in an attempt to streamline the process.45  Indiana, like most other states, 
facilitates a unique worker’s compensation process to help protect the 
employer and carrier’s interest.46 
1. Development of Worker’s Compensation in Indiana 
In Indiana, like in most states, the worker’s compensation scheme 
was created for the employee’s benefit—a benefit that the courts have 
construed liberally.47  In Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., the appellate court 
                                                 
45 IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-7(b) (West 2005).  Section 22-3-3-7(b) of the Indiana Code 
explains the payment schedule deadlines set by the Workmen’s Compensation Board and 
the requirements when case liability is in question.  Id.  The requirements are as follows: 
(b) The first weekly installment of compensation for temporary 
disability is due fourteen (14) days after the disability begins.  Not later 
than fifteen (15) days from the date that the first installment of 
compensation is due, the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier 
shall tender to the employee or to the employee’s dependents, with all 
compensation due, a properly prepared compensation agreement in a 
form prescribed by the [compensation] board.  Whenever an employer 
or the employer’s insurance carrier denies or is not able to determine 
liability to pay compensation or benefits, the employer or the 
employer’s insurance carrier shall notify the workers’ compensation 
board and the employee in writing on a form prescribed by the 
workers’ compensation board not later than thirty (30) days after the 
employer’s knowledge of the claimed injury.  If a determination of 
liability cannot be made within thirty (30) days, the workers’ 
compensation board may approve an additional thirty (30) days upon 
a written request of the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier 
that sets forth the reasons that the determination could not be made 
within thirty (30) days and states the facts or circumstances that are 
necessary to determine liability within the additional thirty (30) days. 
Id. 
46 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining the Indiana worker’s 
compensation system process).  Worker’s compensation programs paid $56 billion in 
benefits in 2004.  Rose, supra note 43, at 198.  The cost to employers for worker’s 
compensation was $87.4 billion, an increase of seven percent.  Id.  In 2003, the National 
Insurance Crime Bureau estimated worker’s compensation fraud losses at $6 billion per 
year.  Id. 
47 See Mayes v. Second Injury Fund, 888 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind. 2008) (describing the 
liberal interpretation that should be used when considering employee protection under the 
state’s worker’s compensation system).  In resolving a plausible dispute as to whether the 
Workmen’s Compensation Board’s actions constituted approval of a continuation of 
liability for an injured employee after her third-party settlement, the court concluded that it 
did because injured employee’s benefits should be liberally construed.  Id.; see DePuy, Inc. 
v. Farmer, 847 N.E.2d 160, 170-71 (Ind. 2006) (providing justifications for a liberal 
construction); Daugherty v. Indus. Contracting & Erecting, 802 N.E.2d 912, 918-19 (Ind. 
2004) (citing to Virginia cases as additional support for a liberal construction); Roberts v. 
ACandS, Inc., 873 N.E.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the Act must 
be construed liberally for the benefit of both parties to achieve the “humane purpose” of 
the Act). 
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held that the purpose of Indiana’s worker’s compensation system is to 
put the burden of caring for those injured within the scope of their 
employment on employers and the consumers of that company’s 
products.48 
In rejecting Freel’s argument that Foster Forbes, the employer and 
insurance carrier, was not entitled to a set-off for benefits already paid, 
the court based its conclusion on the belief that recognizing a set-off “is 
consistent with the purposes of the act.”49  Without the credit, the court 
found that the Freels would not only experience a double recovery for 
the same injury, but would receive from Foster Forbes more money for 
the period of disability than could have been earned if there had been no 
                                                 
48 Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).  The 
plaintiffs in the action were Thomas Freel and the injured employee’s dependants, and 
there was no evidence in the record that his occupational injury caused his death.  Id. at 
1150.  In Freel, the employer, Foster Forbes, was self-insured for purposes of worker’s 
compensation, and subsequently paid the total temporary disability payments to the 
defendant, Freel.  Id. at 1151.  The benefits were paid pursuant to a wage continuation plan, 
but the court reasoned that although the benefits were in effect a contract for payment, this 
contract did not terminate the employer/insurer’s rights to a lien and reimbursement for 
payments in a third-party action.  Id.  Although Freel argued that the contract brought the 
payments outside the Workmen’s Compensation Board’s review, the court denied this 
argument and found the payments were properly before the court based on section 22-3-3-
23(a) of the Indiana Code.  Id.  This code section states as follows: 
Any payments made by the employer to the injured employee during 
the period of his disability, or to his dependents, which . . . were not 
due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval of the 
worker’s compensation board, be deducted from the amount to be 
paid as compensation.  However, the deduction shall be made from 
the distal end of the period during which compensation must be paid, 
except in cases of temporary disability. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-23(a) (West 2005). 
49 Freel, 449 N.E.2d at 1151.  The court explained that such a credit is consistent with the 
purpose of Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act.  Id.  The court explained that the wage 
continuation plan should not negate the employer’s lien because such a result would go 
against public policy.  Id.  The court explained this determination as follows: 
An employer who has paid an employee at the time of that employee’s 
greatest need more than he was obligated to pay should not be 
penalized by being denied full credit for the amount paid above the 
requirements of the act as against the amount which might 
subsequently be determined to be due the employee.  To do so would 
inevitably cause employers to be less generous.  By limiting the 
payments the employer can safely make to the amount of temporary 
total disability the result would be that the employee would lose his 
full salary at the very moment he needs it most.  Such a construction is 
neither liberal nor one made with a view to the public welfare. 
Id. (quoting Cowan v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 529 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)). 
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injury.50  Although the decision recognized other purposes of the Indiana 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the court explicitly stated that the 
Indiana case law “evince[s] a strong policy against double recovery.”51 
Pursuant to the Indiana Code, worker’s compensation is an 
employee’s exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.52  If there are any 
issues about the compensability of a claim, all disputes are resolved 
before the Worker’s Compensation Board.53  Indiana employers and 
carriers, like those throughout the rest of the nation, have to remain 
cognizant of the recent increase in worker’s compensation litigation, 
especially as the nation continues to suffer through one of its worst 
recessions.54  Due to the recession, employees are more likely than ever 
to claim worker’s compensation benefits, resulting in a dramatic increase 
in fraudulent claims.55 
                                                 
50 Id.  The benefits were paid pursuant to a wage continuation plan created between 
Freel and Foster Forbes, but the court still found that the plan developed between the 
parties did not preclude the requirement for lien repayment.  Id. 
51 Id. (citing IND. CODE § 22-3-2-13; IND. CODE § 22-3-3-10; IND. CODE § 22-3-3-23; IND. 
CODE § 22-3-3-31; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Dipolito, 344 N.E.2d 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); 
Snow Hill Coal Corp. v. Cook, 109 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1952); Bebout v. F.L. Mendez 
& Co., 37 N.E.2d 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1941)). 
52 IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (West 2005).  The code section states: 
The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to [Indiana 
Code] 22-3-2 through [Indiana Code] 22-3-6 on account of personal 
injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies 
of such employee, the employee’s personal representatives, 
dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of 
such injury or death, except for remedies available under [Indiana 
Code] 5-2-6.1. 
Id. 
53 Id. § 22-3-4-5.  The statute explains the procedure of compensation disputes as follows: 
(a) If the employer and the injured employee or the injured employee’s 
dependents disagree in regard to the compensation payable under 
[Indiana Code] 22-3-2 through [Indiana Code] 22-3-6 or, if they have 
reached such an agreement, which has been signed by them, filed with 
and approved by the worker’s compensation board, and afterward 
disagree as to the continuance of payments under such agreement, or 
as to the period for which payments shall be made, or to the amount to 
be paid, because of a change in conditions since the making of such 
agreement, either party may then make an application to the board for 
the determination of the matters in dispute. 
Id. 
54 See Roberto Ceniceros, Hard-up Investigators Battle Against Rise in Comp Fraud, BUS. INS. 
(Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091108/ISSUE01/311089974 
(explaining that the recession has triggered a wave of frivolous claims); see also infra note 58 
and accompanying text (describing the rise in frivolous lawsuits including worker’s 
compensation). 
55 See Ceniceros, supra note 54 (stating that the recession has triggered a rise in 
fraudulent worker’s compensation claims); infra Part II.A.2 (examining the effect of the 
Great Recession on worker’s compensation benefits).  The increased number of fraudulent 
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2. Recent Trends in Worker’s Compensation:  The Recession Effect 
The recession has significantly impacted all parties involved in the 
worker’s compensation process, despite procedures designed to 
streamline the process.56  Worker’s compensation insurance carriers have 
experienced double-digit premiums and profit losses.57  Claim frequency 
decreased in 2009, but fraudulent claims have increased significantly 
since the beginning of the recession.58 
Increased fraudulent claims and competition with lower demand has 
caused worker’s compensation carriers to incur steep profit losses.59  
Indemnity claim costs are also a concern for parties to worker’s 
compensation systems, as states are becoming more willing to impose 
the intervention requirement to guarantee the subrogation rights of 
carriers.60  The right to subrogation is important to carriers because of the 
cost savings; however, this right is not always guaranteed.61 
                                                                                                             
claims can be an indication that employers’ ability to cut costs and stay afloat may be 
weakened, especially since fewer jobs are now available.  Ceniceros, supra note 54. 
56 Ceniceros, supra note 54; see also infra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the 
decline in carriers’ profitability). 
57 Joan E. Collier, Long Recession Hammers Comp Carriers, PROPERTYCASUALTY360º (Aug. 
30, 2010), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2010/08/30/long-recession-hammers-
comp-carriers-.  Profitability is declining rapidly for worker’s compensation carriers, 
according to Rober P. Hartwig, president of the Insurance Information Institute.  Id.  “We 
are earning about 40-to-50 percent less than we were pre-crises . . . .”  Id.  He went on to 
explain that the demand for worker’s compensation coverage has declined in correlation 
with the rising unemployment rate over the last two years, causing the largest impact to 
worker’s compensation in sixty years.  Id. 
58 Ceniceros, supra note 54; see also Stephen J. Klingel, Wokers’ Comp in a Precarious 
Position, PROPERTYCASUALTY360º (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/ 
2010/08/16/workers-comp-in-a-precarious-position (explaining that claim frequency in 
2009 has continued to decline due to a tightened job market).  Worker’s compensation 
fraud appears to be rising rapidly, except cases of claimants who take on jobs while also 
claiming to be disabled, which can be explained by the limited availability of jobs.  
Ceniceros, supra note 54. 
59 Klingel, supra note 58.  Worker’s compensation insurance industry faces several 
challenges.  Id. 
60 See WICKERT, supra note 27, at 33 (listing the states that have imposed an intervention 
requirement).  Arkansas is one such state that has imposed an intervention requirement.  
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-410(b)(1) (West 2011); see also John Garner Meats v. Ault, 828 
S.W.2d 866, 867 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting the statute’s requirements).  Arkansas 
law requires the carrier to intervene or risk losing its subrogation interest, one of the 
minority of states to have such a requirement.  See id. at 867 (interpreting section 11-9-
410(b)(1) of the Arkansas Code); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11.1 (West 2011) (explaining 
that Georgia law requires intervention by carrier to protect subrogation rights). 
61 See Collier, supra note 57 (explaining that indemnity costs are finally starting to slow 
down); see also WICKERT, supra note 27, at 33 (listing states that have imposed an 
intervention requirement on carriers). 
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B. Right to Subrogation for Carriers 
“Subrogation is the right of the insurer to be put in the position of 
the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally 
responsible to the insured for a loss paid by the insurer.”62  A carrier’s 
right to subrogation will usually be protected under common law and 
various states’ statutes.63  Very few areas of law vary more than the area 
of worker’s compensation subrogation.64  Other than underwriting, 
subrogation is one of just a few areas in the insurance industry where 
money is “paid to the carrier rather than by the carrier.”65  All states have 
some type of third-party liability subrogation act.66  The Indiana Code 
“makes the employee in effect a constructive trustee for the employer of 
that portion of the settlement [or judgment] necessary to fully reimburse 
the employer for amounts it expended on the employee’s behalf under 
the Act.”67  Some states have reaffirmed this notion that the employee is 
the carrier’s trustee.  Courts have found that a claimant and a third-party 
                                                 
62 John Dwight Ingram, Priority Between Insurer and Insured in Subrogation Recoveries, 3 
CONN. INS. L.J. 105, 106–07 (1996–1997) (quoting 16 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 61.1 (Ronald A. Anderson & Mark S. Rhodes eds., rev. ed. 1983)). 
63 See WICKERT, supra note 27, at 25–33 (demonstrating the bulk of the fifty states’ 
different subrogation statutes).  Each state has its own separate subrogation statute.  Id.  
Virginia’s subrogation statute is a typical subrogation statute.  VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-
309(A) (West 2011).  Virginia’s subrogation statute reads as follows: 
A) A claim against an employer under this title for injury, occupational 
disease, or death benefits shall create a lien on behalf of the employer 
against any verdict or settlement arising from any right to recover 
damages which the injured employee, his personal representative or 
other person may have against any other party for such injury . . . and 
such employer also shall be subrogated to any such right and may 
enforce, in his own name or in the name of the injured employee or his 
personal representative, the legal liability of such other party. 
Id. 
64 WICKERT, supra note 27, at xxi.  “In this age of bad faith litigation, soaring health care 
provider costs, increased claims and even insurance fraud, subrogation is one of the 
insurance carrier’s most effective tools for maintaining profitability.”  Id.  “[A]llocating 
subrogation recoveries in the context of worker’s compensation claims is not only complex, 
but it also requires an understanding of the intricacies of various state worker’s 
compensation laws which even their own judiciary often do not understand or agree on.”  
Id. at 31. 
65 Id. at xxi.  This ability for carriers’ to recoup the costs expended in paying for 
disability benefits helps to keep the premiums charged to employers as low as possible.  Id. 
66 See id. at 25–33 (providing each state’s respective subrogation statute and its 
requirements). 
67 State v. Mileff, 520 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).  The court explained that a 
valid lien is created against any person with notice of the lien who subsequently acquires 
the property subject to it, pursuant to section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana Code.  Id.; see also 
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005) (describing a carriers’ lien). 
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are liable to the subrogating carrier if they settle a claim without 
reimbursing a carrier.68 
The purpose of subrogation statutes, in most instances, is to prevent 
double recovery by the injured employee from both the compensation 
carrier and the tortfeasor.69  Another purpose of subrogation is to ensure 
that the liable party is not absolved merely because the insured received 
insurance for her own benefit.70  In preventing double recovery, courts 
have found that worker’s compensation usually grants carriers first 
priority in third-party actions.71  Although all fifty states provide for 
some form of subrogation for worker’s compensation carriers, the 
specifics and requirements of vindicating those rights vary from state to 
state.  Indiana is one such state that has a long history of recognizing and 
protecting carriers’ subrogation rights.72 
                                                 
68 WICKERT, supra note 27, at 20–30.  Texas is an active worker’s compensation litigation 
state and has several court holdings that mandate such notice to carriers, as demonstrated 
in multiple Texas Supreme Court decisions.  Id. at 24 (citing Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. 
Great Am. Ins. Co., 408 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex. 1966); Pan Am. Ins. Co. v. Hi-Plains Haulers, 
Inc., 350 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. 1961); Forth Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 246 S.W.2d 865, 869 
(Tex. 1952); Prewitt & Sampson v. City of Dallas, 713 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); 
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. W. Tex. Utils. Co., 165 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex. Comm’n App. 
1942)). 
69 Numerous courts have acknowledged the same strong policy consideration.  See, e.g., 
Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Nat’l Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. 2010); Old Republic Ins. 
Co. v. Ashley, 722 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). 
70 See Capitol Aggregates, 408 S.W.2d at 924 (stating that the purpose of subrogation 
statutes is to protect the carrier, reduce the insurance burden to employers, and ensure that 
the ultimate burden is placed on the negligent party that caused the loss or injury in the 
first place); see also Ingram, supra note 62, at 107–08 (explaining that the doctrine of 
subrogation is based on principles of equity). 
71 Smith v. Gary Pub. Transp. Corp., 893 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).  The 
court denied Smith’s claim that Gary Public Transportation Corporation (“GPTC”) was 
capable of being sued, concluding that a self-insured employer does not constitute “an 
other person,” and is therefore not eligible for suit under section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana 
Code.  Id.  Furthermore, the court went on to find that the “statute also allows an employer 
or worker’s compensation insurer to attach a lien to any damages the injured employee 
received from the third party.  ‘The purpose of the statute is to make the employer or its 
carrier whole and prevent a double recovery by the worker.”’  Id. (quoting Walkup v. 
Wabash Nat’l Corp., 702 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ind. 1998)).  The court further stipulated that to 
require GPTC to pay once as an employer and once as an insurer “does not advance the 
policy of Indiana Code Section 22-3-2-13.”  Id. 
72 See infra note 74 and accompanying text (describing Indiana decisions that have 
strongly disfavored double recovery). 
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1. Indiana Subrogation 
In Indiana, worker’s compensation subrogation is governed by 
section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana Code.73  As a myriad of decisions 
evidence, Indiana strongly disfavors double recovery.74  The courts have 
held, “[t]he purpose of the lien is to prevent double recovery on the part 
of the injured employee.”75  At the same time, the state’s statute aims to 
protect the employer, but not the negligent party.76 
Unlike most other states, Indiana requires that carriers pay their 
“pro-rata share of the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of 
asserting the third party claim.”77  However, the appellate court has 
found that payment of those expenses by a carrier does not need to occur 
until after settlement.78  The appellate court held that the denial of the 
                                                 
73 IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005).  The statute provides that when “judgment is 
obtained and paid, and accepted . . . then from the amount received by the employee or 
dependents there shall be paid to the employer or the . . . carrier . . . the amount of 
compensation paid to the employee or dependents.”  Id. 
74 For examples of Indiana cases disfavoring double recovery, see Travelers Indem. Co., 
927 N.E.2d at 379; Mayes v. Second Injury Fund, 888 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. 2008); DePuy, 
Inc. v. Farmer, 847 N.E.2d 160, 171 (Ind. 2006); Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty P.C. v. Ind. 
Ins. Co., 729 N.E.2d 117, 124 (Ind. 2000); Walkup, 702 N.E.2d at 715; Smith, 893 N.E.2d at 
1139; Ansert Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Ansert, 690 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); 
Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
75 Ansert, 690 N.E.2d at 309 (citing Freel, 449 N.E.2d at 1151). 
76 N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Milhiser, 106 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 1952).  The court found that 
the purpose of the Worker’s Compensation Act was for repayment of the employer and not 
for a negligent third-party.  Id.  The court further found that the third-party should be 
“legally liable for the full amount of damages caused by his negligence.”  Id. 
77 § 22-3-2-13.  The statute stipulates the following: 
[I]f the action against the other person is brought by the injured 
employee or his dependents and judgment is obtained and paid, and 
accepted or settlement is made with the other person, either with or 
without suit, then from the amount received by the employee or 
dependents there shall be paid to the employer or the employer’s 
compensation insurance carrier, subject to its paying its pro-rata share 
of the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of asserting the 
third party claim, the amount of compensation paid to the employee or 
dependents, plus the medical, surgical, hospital and nurses’ services 
and supplies and burial expenses paid by the employer or the 
employer’s compensation insurance carrier and the liability of the 
employer or the employer’s compensation insurance carrier to pay 
further compensation or other expenses shall thereupon terminate, 
whether or not one (1) or all of the dependents are entitled to share in 
the proceeds of the settlement or recovery and whether or not one (1) 
or all of the dependents could have maintained the action or claim for 
wrongful death. 
Id. 
78 Welter v. F.A. Wilhelm Constr., 743 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  In Welter 
v. F.A. Wilhelm Construction, the court held that a carrier had not waived its lien by not 
Kauther: Indiana's Collateral Source Act:  Confusing Courts and Underminin
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
1152 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
carrier’s lien rights would go against the Indiana subrogation statute’s 
“strong policy against an injured employee receiving ‘double 
recovery.’”79 
Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. National Employee Care Systems, Inc. 
concerns lien rights of worker’s compensation carriers under Indiana 
law.80  In Schneider, the injured employee and tortfeasor entered into a 
settlement agreement for a lesser amount than was paid in worker’s 
compensation benefits without notifying or reimbursing the employer’s 
carrier.81  The court held in favor of the carrier, stating that to find 
otherwise would promote improper settlements and leave the carrier 
with nowhere to turn for the recovery it was owed.82  Such a result, the 
                                                                                                             
paying its share of expenses as they were incurred.  Id.  Welter was injured on the job by a 
third-party, and he subsequently settled his lawsuit after receiving worker’s compensation 
benefits from his employer’s various carriers.  Id. at 1256.  The court explained that 
payment need not be made by the employer because the pro-rata share of expenses could 
not be determined until after a settlement had been reached.  Id. at 1259.  The court held 
that the carrier had not waived its subrogation right by not paying “its pro rata share of the 
costs and expenses as they were being incurred.”  Id. at 1256. 
79 Id. at 1258.  The court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
employer’s carrier after the carrier intervened to secure its lien right.  Id. at 1259.  The court 
further explained that “prohibition against double recovery had been a part of worker’s 
compensation law since its inception and remains intact.”  Id. at 1258.  The court stipulated 
that the trial court was correct in its summary judgment ruling for the carrier because it 
relied “upon the clear and unambiguous language of the statute.”  Id. at 1259.  The court 
further explained that although the legislature never intended to abridge the remedies an 
employee has against a third-party in tort law, it sought to prevent an injured party from 
experiencing a double recovery.  Id. at 1258 (citing Waldridge v. Futurex Indus., Inc., 714 
N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. Ct. App 1999)). 
80 469 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir. 2006).  In Schneider, a truck driver was injured on the job by 
a third-party tortfeasor and subsequently received worker’s compensation benefits.  Id. at 
655.  The injured worker sued the tortfeasor’s employer to collect damages.  Id.  Initially the 
carrier sought intervention to secure its subrogation but withdrew after reassurances of lien 
protection from the parties.  Id.  The court found that joinder in an action against a third-
party isn’t required, as an “employer may, within ninety (90) days after receipt of notice of 
suit . . . join in the action upon his motion so that all orders of court after hearing and 
judgment shall be made for his protection.”  Id. at 658 (quoting IND. CODE § 22-3-2-13, ¶ 8); 
see also Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1309 (Ind. 1998) (discussing joinder in 
third-party actions). 
81 Schneider, 469 F.3d at 656.  Despite the pre-settlement representations to the carrier by 
the employee and the third-party that the lien would be protected, the carrier never 
received its portion.  Id.  While negotiating the settlement with the third-party, the 
employee provided in their written agreement that he would assume responsibility of the 
carriers’ lien rights and indemnify the tortfeasor.  Id.  The district court, based on the 
written agreement’s indemnity provision, held that the employee was solely responsible to 
pay the lien.  Id. at 657.  The employee appealed, arguing that the carrier waived its lien 
right by failing to timely intervene.  Id.  Further, the employee argues that he is under no 
duty to protect the carrier’s interests.  Id. 
82 Id.  The court held in favor of the carrier, a decision the court found was in furtherance 
of the purpose and requirements of the state’s workers’ compensation statute.  Id. at 659–
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court explained, would undermine the purpose of the state’s subrogation 
statute to protect the interests of carriers.83 
The Seventh Circuit in Schneider, applying Indiana worker’s 
compensation law, held that carriers’ lien rights “are clearly 
established.”84  Since the creation of worker’s compensation in Indiana, 
carriers’ liens have been given priority in third-party awards.85  The 
court held that the statute itself gives worker’s compensation carriers 
lien rights, and “there is nothing in the Indiana statute or its interpretive 
case law that makes intervention anything other than permissive.”86  A 
                                                                                                             
60.  The court referenced Indiana’s subrogation statute to make its ruling.  Id.  The court 
explained that the statute “requir[ed] the lienholder’s approval of any settlement between 
the injured employee and the third-party tortfeasor.”  Id. at 657.  Thus, it was clear by the 
ruling that to find for the employee, and against the carrier, would be contrary to the 
court’s interpretation of the statute.  Id. at 658 (citing Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1309).  The 
Schneider court specifically explained, “[b]ecause settlement serves as a bar to further 
recovery against the third-party, without a consent requirement, an employee could settle a 
lawsuit for an amount well below . . . costs and leave the employer with nowhere to turn 
for the additional money owed.”  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1309). 
83 Id. at 659–60.  The court concluded the worker’s compensation carrier would be left 
“with nowhere to turn for the additional money owed” undermining the purpose of the 
state’s subrogation statute meant to protect carriers’ interests.  Id. at 658.  The court, 
reiterating the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation of the subrogation statute’s purpose, 
mandated that “[t]he employer must either give written consent or be ‘fully indemnified or 
protected by court order.’”  Id. (quoting Koval, 693 N.E.2d at 1309). 
84 Id. at 657.  The court explained that by operation of section 22-3-2-13 of the Indiana 
Code, the carriers’ rights “are clearly established.”  Id.  The statute provides in pertinent 
part: 
[T]he injured employee . . . may commence legal proceedings against 
the other person to recover damages notwithstanding 
the . . . compensation insurance carrier’s payment 
of . . . compensation . . . . In that case, however, if the action against the 
other person is brought by the injured employee . . . and . . . settlement 
is made with the other person, either with or without suit, then from 
the amount received by the employee . . . there shall be paid to 
the . . . employer’s compensation insurance carrier . . . the amount of 
compensation paid to the employee . . . . 
. . . . 
If the injured employee . . . shall agree to receive compensation 
from . . . the employer’s compensation insurance carrier . . . the 
empoyer’s compensation insurance carrier shall have a lien upon any 
settlement award . . . out of which the employee might be compensated 
from the third party. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005) (emphasis added). 
85 Schneider, 469 F.3d at 657; Ind. State Highway Comm’n v. White, 291 N.E.2d 550, 552 
(Ind. 1973); Welter v. F.A. Wilhelm Constr., 743 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); 
Dearing v. Perry, 499 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
86 Schneider, 469 F.3d at 658.  The court held that a carrier is a lienholder, rather than a 
subrogee, and requires notice of a third-party settlement and must give its consent 
regardless of whether it chooses to intervene in the action.  Id. at 658–59.  Determining that 
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new development in the determination of lien rights for worker’s 
compensation carriers has been the recent tort reform movement and its 
effect on the collateral source rule.87 
C. Tort Reform:  Collateral Source Rule 
The collateral source rule is both a rule of evidence and a rule of 
damages.88  The collateral source rule bars the introduction of evidence 
of payments at trial if the plaintiff was reimbursed by a collateral source 
for sustained injuries.89  It was first adopted in England, where it arose 
with the dawn of commercial insurance and was adopted by U.S. 
jurisdictions over 150 years ago.90  It was first announced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1854.91 
A collateral source is any payment “from a source wholly 
independent of the tort-feasor.”92  The most typical example of a 
collateral source is health insurance benefits received by a plaintiff, but 
disability and unemployment benefits such as Medicaid, Medicare, and 
                                                                                                             
intervention was not required, the court stated that “there is nothing in the Indiana statute 
or its interpretive case law that makes intervention anything other than permissive; there is 
no authority for the proposition that intervention is a necessary prerequisite to the operation 
of the statutory lien rights.”  Id. at 658.  The court dismissed the employee’s argument that 
the carrier was required to intervene in the action against the third-party to secure its 
subrogation right.  Id. at 659. 
87 See infra Part II.C (discussing the development of the tort reform movement and its 
effect on the collateral source rule). 
88 Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule:  Seeking Greater 
Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 210 (2009). 
89 See Daena A. Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule:  The Effects of Tort Reform 
and Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 799 (1988) (“Under this rule, a 
defendant must bear the full cost of the injury he caused the plaintiff, regardless of any 
compensation the plaintiff receives from an independent or ‘collateral’ source.”). 
90 Benjet, supra note 88, at 210; see Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America:  Abrogating 
the Collateral Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 348 (2008) (detailing the 
impact of the insurance industry and the strength of the tort reform movement). 
91 Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152, 152 (1854).  The Court for the first time 
allowed evidence of insurance payments and held that such payments could not relieve a 
negligent third-party of liability.  Id. at 155. 
92 Do v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.W.2d 853, 859 (Minn. 2010) (emphasis omitted).  
The court relied on Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of collateral source rule: 
Under this rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his 
injuries from a source wholly independent of the tort-feasor, the payment 
should not be deducted from the damages which he would otherwise 
collect from the tort-feasor.  In other words, a defendant tort-feasor 
may not benefit from the fact that the plaintiff has received money 
from other sources as a result of the defendant’s tort, e.g. sickness and 
health insurance. 
Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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worker’s compensation also qualify.93  Although every state retains the 
rule in some fashion, recent changes in health care have prompted 
critiques and calls for reformation of the rule.94 
Critics of the rule, including those who advocate for tort reform, 
argue that abolition of the “collateral source rule will both decrease 
insurance premiums and reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits.”95  
Opponents of reform argue that such abrogation will undermine 
America’s tort system and, in accordance with inconclusive empirical 
studies, will do little to reduce insurance rates.96  Rule supporters have 
advanced several arguments in support of its retention.97  They argue 
that plaintiffs require larger recoveries to pay contingent attorney fees.98  
The jury will get confused if asked to reduce the damage award by 
collateral source payments.99  Additionally, the negligent party should be 
forced to bear full responsibility for his wrongdoing and any risk of 
windfall should go to the injured party, not the negligent one.100  Further, 
placing the full burden on defendants deters negligent conduct.101  The 
“primary argument favoring the rule is that third-party collateral” 
sources can have a statutorily enumerated subrogation interest in the 
benefits the plaintiff receives, which offsets any windfall risk.102  As held 
by the Supreme Court, the “likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly 
                                                 
93 See Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 799–800 (explaining the different areas of benefits). 
94 Benjet, supra note 88, at 211 (citing Michael K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health 
Care Provider Reimbursement Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in 
Personal Injury Suits, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 453, 458–59 (1998)).  “The common law 
collateral source rule developed during a time when health insurance and publicly 
provided health benefits did not exist.”  Id.  So although there are still prevalent 
justifications for the rule due to the recent changes in health care, it is increasingly viewed 
as a windfall for plaintiffs.  Id.; see also F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort 
Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 457 (2006) (describing the advent of the tort 
reform movement in the United States). 
95 Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346; see id. (explaining that although tort reform was 
intended to reduce insurance premiums and costs, both remain high while the economy is 
strained). 
96 See id.  Empirical studies on tort reform effects on insurance rates concluded “without 
a clear result.”  Id. 
97 See Benjet, supra note 88, at 210 (“Several reasons are advanced to justify the collateral 
source rule.”). 
98 See id. at 210–11 (citing Beard, supra note 94, at 458–59). 
99 Id. at 210–11. 
100 See Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 801 (citing Burks v. Webb, 99 S.E.2d 629, 636 (Va. 
1957). 
101 See Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Cleveland, 369 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1985) (explaining that Wisconsin’s collateral source rule is intended to deter negligent 
conduct by placing the whole burden on the negligent party). 
102 Wershbale, supra note 90, at 349 (citing Hubbard, supra note 94, at 483). 
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outweighs the value of [collateral source] evidence.”103  Recently, state 
courts and legislatures have reformed the once common collateral source 
rule.104 
D. Collateral Source Statute Reform and Its Abrogation of Subrogation Rights 
There are numerous arguments in support of collateral source 
statute reform, including the following:  it allows the injured party to 
recover twice for the same injury; the American tort system is “the most 
expensive . . . in the world”; and reform would help to reduce costs.105  
Reform proponents argue that the rule allows plaintiffs to recover a 
windfall.106  Since subrogation is rare, “due to the time and expense 
involved in securing subrogation,” reform advocates dispute that the 
risk of windfall is not actually eliminated.107 
Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, forty-two have 
restricted, in some way, the collateral source rule.108  In those that have, 
“there is little uniformity across the jurisdictions as to the manner in 
which each has modified the collateral source rule.”109  Some states have 
                                                 
103 Eichel v. N.Y. Cen. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963).  The court held that evidence of 
collateral payments was properly excluded, explaining that evidence that plaintiff received 
collateral source “benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.”  Id. 
104 See Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346, 351 (explaining that most states have enacted 
legislation that limits the application of the collateral source rule). 
105 Id. at 346–47.  But see Alexee Deep Conroy, Note, Lessons Learned from the “Laboratories 
of Democracy”:  A Critique of Federal Medical Liability Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1170–
71 (2006) (arguing that tort reform has no impact on the healthcare crises, one of the biggest 
motivators for such reform). 
106 Wershbale, supra note 90, at 349.  According to the website: 
The concern is that where the fact-finder remains uninformed, or there 
is no collateral source setoff, a successful plaintiff acquires a windfall, 
being awarded monetary damages in excess of necessary and 
reasonable medical costs.  Proponents support abolition of the 
collateral source rule on the grounds that plaintiffs should not be 
compensated twice for the same injury. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
107 See id. (citing Hubbard, supra note 94, at 483.  Subrogation rights are unenforced due 
to “difficulty in establishing that a damage award encompasses the particular collateral 
benefits paid out by the insurer, high administrative costs associated with seeking 
subrogation, and potential damage to the insurer’s reputation.”  Id. at 349–50 (citing 
CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM:  EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES (2004), 
available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/Report.pdf); see Ark. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 
N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 2010) (showing the strong relationship between the collateral source rule 
and subrogation rights). 
108 Benjet, supra note 88, at 211.  Even in jurisdictions where the rule has been applied 
generally, it is limited in health care liability cases.  Id. 
109 Wershbale, supra note 90, at 351.  Some jurisdictions have altered the rule exclusively 
for medical malpractice cases, others for all personal injury cases, and still others complete 
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narrow restrictions and modifications that are only applicable to medical 
malpractice cases.110  Other states have changed the collateral source rule 
for all personal injury actions.111  The states’ reform acts face various 
constitutional challenges and some have been overturned as 
unconstitutional.112 
Further, lack of uniformity is the consideration of collateral source 
evidence by the trier of fact in worker’s compensation cases.113  Some 
jurisdictions allow for the presentation of collateral source evidence only 
after the verdict is rendered.114  Others allow the trier of fact to consider 
such evidence, but do not mandate it.115  A few jurisdictions, pursuant to 
subrogation statutes, will disallow a set-off if a collateral source has a 
                                                                                                             
abrogation with exceptions for specific areas such as worker’s compensation.  Id.  Some 
jurisdictions allow the evidence at trial, others allow it only if a subrogation interest exists, 
while some only allow the evidence for post-verdict collateral source reductions.  Id. at 357. 
110 ALA. CODE § 6-5-545 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3333.1 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, 
§ 2906 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2010); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1D (2004); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 (West 1999); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34.1 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-
3-405 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2006). 
111 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2005); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 52-225a, 52-225b, 52-225c (2005); FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-
10 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205.1 (2003); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2011); IOWA CODE § 668.14 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.6303 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2011); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4545 (McKinney 2007 & Supp 
2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2323.41 (2004) OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2007); W. VA. 
CODE § 55-7B-9a (2008). 
112 O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky. 1995); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 
825, 835 (N.H. 1980), overruled on other grounds by, Cmty. Res. For Justice, Inc., v. City of 
Manchester, 917 A.2d 707 (N.H. 2007).  Tort reforms meet three different constitutional 
challenges, including the right to trial by jury, due process rights, and separation of powers 
principles.  Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346. 
113 Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).   
114 ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2005); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 52-225a, 52-225c (2005); FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT § 663-10 (2011); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205, 5/2-1205.1 (2003); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2000); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS  § 600.6303 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.36 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2011); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2000); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW 
§ 4545 (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 31.580 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9a 
(2008). 
115 ALA. CODE § 6-5-545 (2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2; IOWA CODE § 668.14 (1998); 
see also Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. 2010) (holding that 
under the Indiana collateral source statute, the jury was allowed to “consider” the 
obligation to repay a workman’s compensation lien, but was not mandated under the jury 
instruction given). 
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subrogation right.116  Some withhold final judgments until determining 
subrogation rights and whether those rights will be pursued.117  Given 
the variations of collateral source rule enactments, this area of law has 
become less than clear.118  Indiana is one of the several states that have 
changed its approach to the collateral source rule.119 
1. Collateral Source Rule in Indiana 
Indiana is one of the jurisdictions that has abrogated the common 
law collateral source rule.120  In 1986, the Indiana legislature enacted 
section 34-44-1-1 through 34-44-1-3 of the Indiana Code, the state’s 
collateral source statute.121  In Indiana, the collateral source doctrine 
ensures that a plaintiff’s recovery is not reduced due to recovery from 
other sources, while preventing double liability for the tortfeasor.122  The 
statute allows evidence of worker’s compensation benefits to be 
presented to establish proof of the amount of money the plaintiff is 
legally required to repay.123  Indiana is one of only fifteen states that 
                                                 
116 ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.070, 09.55.548 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2005); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-225a, 52-225c (2005 & Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (2011); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1205, 5/2-1205.1 (2003); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (2000); MINN. STAT. § 548.251 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
308 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2011). 
117 HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (2000); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (2000). 
118 See Wershbale, supra note 90, at 352 (“[T]he law in this area has become a jurisdiction-
specific legal patchwork.”). 
119 Id. 
120 Shirley v. Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. 1996).  Plaintiff’s husband, Shirley, was a 
public school employee who opted to have extra money taken out of his paycheck to go 
into his pension account.  Id.  The pension payments went to the widow and plaintiff upon 
his death.  Id.  The tortfeasors, on appeal, argued that the district court erred when it 
excluded this “collateral source” evidence at trial because the evidence would have off-set 
the damage award.  Id.  The court held that although the collateral source rule had been 
abrogated, enumerated exceptions, such as directly paid insurance benefits, still would be 
barred from introduction.  Id. at 534, 536. 
121 See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind. 2010) (explaining 
that the stated purposes for the statute were to enable accurate assessment of the party’s 
loss and to prevent double recovery); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-1 (West 2011) 
(stipulating that the evidence should be considered to preserve lien rights). 
122 See CSX Transp., Inc., v. Gardner, 874 N.E.2d 357, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining 
that a common effect of these characteristics is that the injured party recovers more than 
necessary to make it whole). 
123 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2011).  The statute states:  “In a personal injury or 
wrongful death action, the court shall allow the admission into evidence of . . . (2) proof of 
the amount of money that the plaintiff is required to repay, including worker’s 
compensation benefits, as a result of the collateral benefits received.”  Id. 
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allows some form of collateral source payment evidence at trial.124  The 
statute stipulates that the trier of fact must “consider” collateral source 
payment evidence, including worker’s compensation payments, when 
determining an award amount.125 
After the lower courts rendered different interpretations of the 
statute’s language, the Indiana Supreme Court on May 27, 2010, in 
Travelers Indemnity Co. of America v. Jarrells, interpreted the “consider” 
provision of section 34-44-1-3 of the Indiana Code and its relation to the 
Worker’s Compensation Act’s subrogation provision.126  In 2002, Jerry 
Jarrells was seriously injured at work, and as a result, his employer’s 
compensation carrier, Travelers Indemnity Company of America, paid 
him worker’s compensation disability benefits.127  Jarrells brought a 
third-party claim against the negligent tortfeasor.128  At the trial, Jarrells 
testified that “he might have to reimburse Travelers for [worker’s 
compensation] payments.”129  The trial court gave the jury the pattern 
“Collateral Source Instruction,” which stipulated “[i]n 
determining . . . damages, you must consider . . . [p]ayments for worker’s 
compensation.”130  The trial court rejected Travelers’ lien, finding the 
                                                 
124 Wershbale, supra note 90, at 352–53.  “These states include Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.”  Id. 
125 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-3.  The statute reads:  “Proof of payments under section 2 of 
this chapter shall be considered by the trier of fact in arriving at the amount of any award 
and shall be considered by the court in reviewing awards that are alleged to be excessive.”  
Id.; see Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377 (applying this statute). 
126 Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 376.  The trial court denied Travelers’ lien, holding that the 
“requested relief would impose a double setoff on the recovery because the jury had 
already deducted the worker’s compensation benefits from the gross award.”  Id. at 376.  
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and entered judgment for Travelers.  Id.  
The appellate court found that the lien was included in the award amount and was owed to 
the carrier.  Id. 
127 Id. at 375.  The disability payments paid by Travelers to Jarrells consisted of $21,025.91 
in disability benefits and $45,109.76 in medical payments, for a total of $66,135.67.  Id. 
128 Id.  Jarrells notified Travelers of the third-party action, Travelers informed Jarrells of 
its lien rights in the amount of $66,135.67, but chose not to intervene.  Id. 
129 Id. at 376; see id. at 375–76 (stipulating that “Jarrells presented evidence of the worker’s 
compensation payments” and acknowledged that “he might have to reimburse Travelers”). 
130 Id. at 377.  The pattern “Collateral Source Instruction” used in this case provided the 
following: 
If you find that Jerry Jarrells is entitled to recover, you shall consider 
evidence of payment made by some collateral source to compensate 
Jarrells for damages resulting from the accident in question.  In 
determining the amount of Jarrells’ damages, you must consider the 
following type of collateral source payments: 
 Payments for worker’s compensation. 
In determining the amount received by Jarrells from collateral sources, 
you may consider any amount Jarrells is required to repay to a 
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award had been set-off already, but the court of appeals reversed, with 
the Indiana Supreme Court granting a transfer.131 
The central issue concerned the allocation of damages, specifically 
whether the jury deducted the amount of worker’s compensation 
benefits that Jarrells received from the total damages figure.132  The court 
held that the carrier was not entitled to a statutorily enumerated lien 
even though the collateral source instruction required the jury to 
“consider” whether the worker was required to repay any of the 
collateral source benefits received.133  The court reasoned that directing 
the jury to “consider” the benefits makes the instruction less than clear as 
to how the jury will consider the payments.134  The court conceded the 
possibility that the jury had included the amount, but found that this 
conclusion was “less likely,” instead deferring to the trial court to infer 
the jury’s intent.135  The court further considered lien complexity as a 
reason the jury may not have deducted the benefits.136  Uncertainty as to 
damage allocation has become so paramount that the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                             
collateral source and the cost to Jarrells of collateral benefits received.  
Jarrells may not recover more than once for any item of loss sustained. 
Id. 
131 Id. at 376.  After Jarrells notified Travelers of his subsequent judgment, he refused to 
reimburse its worker’s compensation lien, claiming the “jury already reduced the award by 
the amount of the work[ers’] comp[ensation] benefits and the award should not be reduced 
further after judgment.”  Id. 
132 Id. at 377.  The court explained that the purpose of the statute—to prevent double 
recovery—assumes that the jury would award a lessor amount after “considering” the 
worker’s compensation benefits.  Id. 
133 Id. at 378–79. 
134 Id. at 378.  The court found: 
The jury could have interpreted this instruction in at least two ways.  
The trial court concluded that the jury deducted the amount of 
worker’s compensation payments from the amount of Jarrells’ 
damages in order to prevent Jarrells from “recover[ing] more than 
once for any item of loss sustained.”  The Court of Appeals found that 
the amount of worker’s compensation payments should be included in 
the jury’s value of damages to permit Jarrells to fulfill the obligation to 
repay. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
135 Id. at 378–79; see id. at 379 (‘“[T]he trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the 
evidence and assess whether the jury’s verdict is rationally based’ in determining whether 
the jury verdict was excessive.” (quoting Murry v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 153 (3d 
Cir. 1979)).  The stated purpose of the Collateral Source Act, as “emphasized to the jury,” is 
to prevent double recovery by the injured party; therefore, the court reasoned it was 
“plausible” that the jury deducted the amount.  Id. at 379. 
136 Id.  The court explained that the calculation of Travelers’ lien was complex and 
without an instruction to the jury on how to calculate it, the jury could not have 
determined an amount of set-off.  Id. 
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Court recently recognized the risks and recommended methods to 
minimize potential problems.137 
2. U.S. Supreme Court’s Recognition of the Risks 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of uncertain damage 
allocation and the risk of settlement manipulation in Arkansas Department 
of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn.138  The Court indicated that states 
should mandate a post-settlement agreement detailing how the award is 
stipulated to prevent uncertainty as to collateral source payment 
allocation in a jury award.139  Although unwilling to express a view on 
the matter, the Court left “open the possibility that such rules and 
procedures might be employed to meet concerns about settlement 
manipulation.”140 
The introduction of collateral source evidence in worker’s 
compensation cases leaves courts confused as to damage allocation 
because there is not a concrete standard for evidence consideration 
where subrogation liens are at stake.141  To eliminate this confusion, 
some states have found the introduction of collateral source evidence 
inadmissible.142  The U.S. Supreme Court has advised that when such 
                                                 
137 See infra Part II.D.2 (explaining the Supreme Court’s decision addressing collateral 
source payment evidence). 
138 547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006).  The Court explained: 
Even in the absence of such a postsettlement agreement, though, the 
risk that parties to a tort suit will allocate away the [s]tate’s interest can 
be avoided either by obtaining the [s]tate’s advance agreement to an 
allocation or, if necessary, by submitting the matter to a court for 
decision.  For just as there are risks in underestimating the value of 
readily calculable damages in settlement negotiations, so also is there a 
countervailing concern that a rule of absolute priority might preclude 
settlement in a large number of cases, and be unfair to the recipient in 
others. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
139 Id.  The Court explained that another option besides a post-settlement stipulation is 
having the court dictate the interest or obtaining an advance agreement.  Id.  The Court 
further explained that some states that have such special rules and procedures have been 
successful at preventing confusion as to the allocation of a damages award.  Id. at 288 n.18. 
140 Id. 
141 See supra Part II.D.1 (describing the Indiana Supreme Court’s uncertainty as to the 
jury’s intent in the Travelers decision); see also supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text 
(describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s recommendation that to avoid such uncertainty, 
procedures should be put in place that the jury can definitively follow); infra Part III.A 
(describing how the court in Travelers was unable to definitively ascertain the meaning of 
“consider” in the Collateral Source Statute, so there was uncertainty as to the jury’s intent 
in the damage allocation). 
142 For examples of states holding evidence of collateral payments inadmissible, see El 
Paso Field Servs. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lopez, No. 01-07-00999-CV, 2010 WL 2133885, at *5 (Tex. 
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evidence is introduced, guidelines must be in place to protect against 
ambiguity and uncertainty.143  However, as Indiana’s Collateral Source 
Statute is presently written, uncertainty as to damage allocation is 
inevitable.144  Part III addresses these problems.145 
III.  INDIANA’S COLLATERAL SOURCE STATUTE MUST BE REVISED TO 
PROTECT CARRIERS’ STATUTORILY ENUMERATED SUBROGATION RIGHTS 
This Part’s purpose is to demonstrate that Indiana’s Collateral 
Source Statute needs to be revised for three reasons.146  First, worker’s 
compensation carriers risk losing their statutorily enumerated liens on 
damage awards when the Collateral Source Statute is applied in third-
party actions.147  Second, the ambiguous language of the Collateral 
Source Statute risks confusing the jury as to which party bears the 
burden of proof regarding the allocation of damages.148  Finally, as 
written, the Collateral Source Statute contradicts its own purpose by 
allowing double recovery by injured parties and promotes frivolous 
litigation.149 
                                                                                                             
Ct. App. May 27, 2010); Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); 
Polito v. Holland, 365 S.E.2d 273, 275 (Ga. 1988). 
143 See supra Part.II.D.2 (suggesting that guidelines should be set for guidance to the jury 
and to prevent fraudulent settlements or damage allocation uncertainty). 
144 See infra Part III (explaining the problems facing and arguments for changing 
Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute). 
145 See infra Part III (discussing the problems with the recent interpretation of the 
Collateral Source Statute and the Collateral Source Statute itself). 
146 See infra Part III.B (describing the three problems encountered when the Collateral 
Source Statute is applied in worker’s compensation lien rights actions). 
147 See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ind. 2010) (explaining 
that under the Collateral Source rule, the employer’s worker’s compensation carrier was 
not entitled to its statutorily enumerated lien on the third-party judgment); see also Calvin 
R. Wright, Note, The Collateral Source Rule in Georgia:  A New Method of Equal Protection 
Analysis Brings a Return to the Old Common Law Rule, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 835, 843–44 (1992) 
(explaining that most state legislatures that have abolished the collateral source rule still 
apply it when subrogation rights are at stake as a protection of those rights). 
148 See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-3 (West 2011) (stipulating that such evidence “shall be 
considered by the trier of fact”).  The Indiana Supreme Court found the term “consider” 
from the statute’s language to be ambiguous.  Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 378.  They were 
unable to determine what threshold of evidence was required to meet the “considered” 
requirement of the statute.  Id.  The court further explained that the jury instruction 
“directing the jury to consider the worker’s compensation benefits . . . is less than clear how 
the jury is to take these payments into consideration.”  Id. 
149 See Goldsmith, supra note 89, at 802 (explaining that the purpose of the Collateral 
Source Statute is to prevent double recovery); see also Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377–78 
(stipulating that if Travelers had participated in the trial and provided clarity its lien would 
have been protected). 
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To fully comprehend the need to revise the Collateral Source Statute, 
it is imperative to understand the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in 
Travelers.150  The court for the first time applied the Collateral Source 
Statute in determining a worker’s compensation carrier’s lien rights in a 
third-party action.151  Thus, Part III.A explains that the root cause of the 
subrogation issue in Indiana is the ambiguity in the state’s partially 
abrogated collateral source rule and the subsequent application of the 
rule in the Travelers decision.152  Part III.B explains how the current 
Collateral Source Statute hinders effective litigation and resolution of 
worker’s compensation disputes.153  Finally, this Part explains that the 
Collateral Source Statute’s most recent interpretation undermines long-
standing precedent and the Statute’s own stated purpose.154 
A. Subrogation Rights Upheaval Catalyst 
On May 27, 2010, the Indiana Supreme Court set groundbreaking 
precedent with its refusal to uphold a worker’s compensation carrier’s 
statutorily enumerated post-judgment lien in Travelers Indemnity Co. of 
America v. Jarrells.155  For the first time in Indiana history, the court used 
the Collateral Source Statute as the basis for denying a carrier’s lien 
rights.156  The imposition of the Collateral Source Statute in this way 
indicates what could become an extremely costly trend. 
The Travelers decision is a strong indicator of the future of worker’s 
compensation in Indiana and is indicative of what could become a 
                                                 
150 See supra Part II.D.1 (detailing the application of the Collateral Source Act for the first 
time in a worker’s compensation context in the Travelers decision).  But see Shirley v. 
Russell, 663 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. 1996) (refusing to admit evidence of collateral annuity 
payments in a wrongful death claim); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gardner, 874 N.E.2d 357, 375 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to utilize the Collateral Source Act in similar worker’s 
compensation third-party actions).  Similarly, lien holders are not required to intervene 
because the lien is automatically applied.  Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care 
Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 2006). 
151 Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377. 
152 See infra Part III.B (explaining that the ambiguity leaves the courts and the interested 
parties with little to no direction on how it should be applied in such situations, and the 
effect on the liens when applied). 
153 See infra Part III.B (describing the three problems found in the Collateral Source Rule). 
154 See infra Part III.B (stipulating there are three main problems caused by the Travelers 
decision); see also supra note 123 (showing Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute’s language). 
155 See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the Travelers decision and the court’s analysis); see also 
Kellie M. Barr & Marisol Sanchez, Appellate Civil Case Law Update, RES GESTAE, Sept. 2010, at 
27, 30 (explaining the significance of the decision in Indiana). 
156 See generally Brief of Appellant, Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, No. 29A02-
0807-CV-669 (Ind. Ct. App. Ct. Nov. 7, 2008), 2008 WL 5150592 (arguing that throughout 
Indiana’s history, intervention has not been required, and lien rights are automatic). 
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national trend.157  Tort reform aimed at collateral source rule 
abolishment has become nationally prevalent over the last twenty-five 
years.158  The importance of tort reform is compounded due to worker’s 
compensation’s effect on the economy, which makes the Travelers 
decision all the more significant to Indiana employers and employees.159  
This is especially true as our nation struggles to pull itself out of a 
crippling recession.160 
Employers are required to pay worker’s compensation insurance 
costs in Indiana.161  This cost is increasing rapidly as more employees are 
filing frivolous claims to ensure job security in the present unstable 
economy.162  Worker’s compensation carriers’ costs have increased in 
Indiana in the wake of lower demand for their product, lower profits, 
and higher claims.163  Since employers are legally precluded from 
                                                 
157 See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. 2010) (holding 
that the carrier should have intervened to protect its subrogation right).  The court 
explained that if Travelers would have intervened, it would have “warrant[ed] a new 
trial.”  Id. at 377.  Stipulating further that “a post-trial intervenor, takes the trial as it finds 
it.”  Id.  Many courts will put the insurer’s interests first, “reasoning that ‘when the 
statutory language is unambiguous . . . we will not modify or extend the statute.’”  Ingram, 
supra note 62, at 115 (quoting McCarter v. Alaska Nat’l Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 986, 990 (Alaska 
1994)).  Further, many courts, when the subrogation provisions are clear, reject the 
suggestion that equitable principles should apply, refusing to mandate that the insured 
have first priority.  Id. 
158 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing the reasons advanced by tort 
reform proponents); supra note 106 (explaining the primary argument for tort reform is that 
third-party collateral sources offset any windfall risks). 
159 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (describing the effect worker’s 
compensation has on the economy’s ability to recover from a recession).  Currently, costs 
for worker’s compensation premiums are rising as fraud claims increase and demand for 
carriers decreases, this in turn means higher premiums and thus costs for employers.  
Ceniceros, supra note 54, at 1–2. 
160 Id.  Fraudulent claims became a startling problem at the decline of the economy in 
2009, as workers tried to attain job security through the states’ worker’s compensation 
systems.  Id. 
161 IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005).  The amount of money paid out in disability 
payments is dependant on the type of injury the employee suffers.  JAMES W. HUNT & 
PATRICIA K. STRONGIN, THE LAW OF THE WORKPLACE:  RIGHTS OF EMPLOYERS AND 
EMPLOYEES 115 (1994).  The amount of money paid is usually a “percentage of the worker’s 
pre-disability average wages, . . . with limits on the minimum and maximum amount that 
can be received.”  Id. 
162 See Hogler, supra note 28, at 85 (explaining that employers pass some of the costs of 
worker’s compensation on to their employees through lower wages and reduced hiring); 
see generally Ceniceros, supra note 54, at 12 (describing how carriers are facing a hike in 
fraudulent claims due to the pressures of an unstable economy). 
163 See Hogler, supra note 28, at 85 (explaining that the employer must pass on the costs 
for worker’s compensation to consumers of its products); see also Klingel, supra note 58 
(explaining that worker’s compensation claim frequency continued to decline in 2009 due 
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deducting worker’s compensation costs from employees’ pay, the 
increased costs of worker’s compensation claims must be transferred to 
consumers.164  Higher prices for goods and services during a recession 
only hinder the economy’s ability to rebound. 
Both increased claims and additional litigation requirements increase 
costs for employers.165  The disability payments paid by an employer can 
be recouped through states’ subrogation statutes.166  This function, 
however, is severely limited when the carrier’s lien rights are no longer 
automatically protected.167  The paramount holding in Travelers 
mandates carrier intervention to protect those rights.168  The Collateral 
Source Statute in Indiana is meant to contain costs for all parties 
involved.169  The collateral source rule was abrogated in response to the 
tort reform movement to protect employers and prevent double recovery 
by the plaintiff.170  The Travelers outcome contradicts the purpose of the 
subrogation and collateral source statutes and dramatically increases 
                                                                                                             
to a tightened job market over the last few years).  Although the number of claims declined, 
the number of fraudulent claims increased.  Id. 
164 Hogler, supra note 28, at 85.  Until the economy significantly improves, businesses will 
be in a precarious position.  Klingel, supra note 58. 
165 See Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346 (explaining that as the recession lingers, premium 
costs remain high and litigation costs are on the rise).  Higher litigation costs can only hurt 
employers, not help them during a looming recession. 
166 See WICKERT, supra note 27, at 31 (describing each state’s subrogation statute and 
respective intervention requirements, if any). 
167 See supra notes 64–66 (describing the hindrance on litigation when attaining lien 
rights); see also Wershbale, supra note 90, at 346 (explaining that the reason subrogation 
rights are unenforced is due to the costs associated with attaining them). 
168 See supra notes 126–34 and accompanying text (detailing the court’s decision 
indicating intervention may be required).  In Travelers, the court stipulated that “[i]f 
Travelers had participated in the trial and objected to the instruction, this ambiguity [in the 
statute’s language] would warrant a new trial.”  Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 
N.E.2d 374, 377 (Ind. 2010).  The court further found that as a post-judgment intervenor, 
Travelers was bound to all prior orders and rulings of the case.  Id. at 379. 
169 CSX Transp., Inc., v. Gardner, 874 N.E.2d 357, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  The court 
explained that the Collateral Source Act is meant to keep the injured party from receiving a 
windfall, thus reducing the costs involved.  Id; see supra notes 106, 158 and accompanying 
text (describing the main reason for the tort reform movement, and that the abrogation of 
the Collateral Source Act is to reduce costs). 
170 IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-1–3 (West 2011).  Indiana, like most other states, has 
abrogated its collateral source rule in response to the widespread tort reform movement; 
however, unlike most states, through the use of vague language, Indiana’s statute fails to 
ascertain how evidence of collateral source payments should be presented to the fact finder 
and why such evidence should be considered.  See id.  Proponents of tort reform argue that 
it will both decrease insurance premiums and frivolous lawsuits.  Wershbale, supra note 90, 
at 346.  However, as the Supreme Court indicated in Arkansas Department of Health & 
Human Services, the uncertainty of damage allocation can promote settlement manipulation.  
547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006).  
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litigation costs, hindering judicial efficiency.171  This result appears to 
undermine the purpose of the statute by imposing the burden of proof 
solely on the carriers. 
Proponents of tort reform argue that abolishing the collateral source 
rule will alleviate costs by eliminating plaintiff windfalls and reducing 
the cost of frivolous litigation.172  Nonetheless, as seen in Travelers, the 
collateral source rule has the reverse outcome in the worker’s 
compensation context.173  In Travelers, the plaintiff arguably got exactly 
what reform advocates wish to eliminate—a double recovery.174  This 
decision has also opened the doors to a landslide of unnecessary judicial 
litigation and increased business costs.175 
The purpose of the Indiana subrogation statute is to prevent double 
recovery by plaintiffs while protecting the employer.176  Before the 
Travelers decision, courts interpreting Indiana law held that if an injured 
party agreed to receive benefits from a worker’s compensation carrier, 
that carrier would have a lien upon any settlement award.177  This is in 
furtherance of the long held belief that the employer or its carrier should 
be fully indemnified and protected.178  The Travelers decision does not 
                                                 
171 Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379.  But see Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care 
Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that intervention is not needed for 
protection of the lien because to hold otherwise would contradict the purpose of the 
statute). 
172 See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (providing the reasons for the tort 
reform movement). 
173 Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377–79.  The court held for Jarrells because there was 
uncertainty as to the damage allocation.  Id.  As indicated by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
damage allocation uncertainty leads to manipulation by the injured party and the third-
party tortfeasor.  Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 547 U.S. at 288. 
174 See supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text (detailing how the court could not 
ascertain the jury’s intent as to the allocation of damages, and concluding that it is possible 
the plaintiff already received the amount in its award). 
175 See infra note 187 and accompanying text (explaining that intervention will be 
required to clear up any allocation uncertainty).  Pursuant to the decision and the 
ambiguity of the statute, as recognized by the court, it is clear that carriers will be required 
to intervene to preserve their lien rights.  Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379. 
176 See supra note 74 (citing several Indiana cases that have held a main purpose behind 
the statute is to prevent double recovery); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text 
(explaining that the statute is not to be construed as a protection for the negligent party, but 
rather one for the employer/carrier). 
177 For examples of pre-Travelers decisions, see Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l 
Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Gary Pub. Transp. Corp., 893 
N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Mileff, 520 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1988); Freel v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 449 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
178 Schneider, 469 F.3d at 660.  Where the injured employee is successful in its action, the 
carriers are entitled to a lien without question.  Id.  The court further stated that to accept 
the argument that intervention is needed “would obliterate a central purpose of the statute, 
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follow stare decisis and contravenes the purpose of worker’s 
compensation by denying the carrier’s lien rights.179  The Indiana 
Supreme Court explained that when determining a damage award, the 
jury “may consider” worker’s compensation payments.180  The court held 
that the parties had not presented enough evidence demonstrating a 
requirement to pay collateral source payments, and it was unable to 
determine if the payments had been considered by the jury as mandated 
by statute.181  Instead, the court attempted to interpret the meaning of the 
statute’s uncertain language and found it more “plausible” that the 
payments were “considered” and deducted from the award by the 
jury.182 
The Collateral Source Statute’s failure to allocate the burden of 
evidence left the Travelers court to infer the jury’s intent during award 
compilation.183  Although the court had emphasized to the jury that the 
point of the collateral source rule was to prevent double recovery, its 
ruling made double recovery possible, if not probable.184  During trial, 
the plaintiff made clear that he would have to repay the payments and 
introduced evidence of the amount owed; however, the court still found 
it more “plausible” that the jury had deducted the amount previously 
from the award.185  This ruling runs contrary to the subrogation statute, 
which explicitly requires a repayment of any worker’s compensation 
payments in a third-party action.186 
                                                                                                             
which is to establish and protect the reimbursement rights of worker’s compensation.”  Id. 
659–60. 
179 See supra note 85 (listing four Indiana cases that upheld subrogation rights).  The 
Indiana Supreme Court has also held that applying the subrogation in a way that protects 
the carriers’ rights helps to rightly hold the negligent party liable for all the damages it has 
caused.  N. Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Milhiser, 106 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 1952). 
180 See Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377 (Ind. 2010) (referencing the pattern jury instruction 
given that instructed “you may consider any amount Jarrells is required to repay”). 
181 Id. at 378.  The court found that “by directing the jury to ‘consider’ the worker’s 
compensation benefits paid and also to ‘consider’ the obligation to repay, the instruction is 
less than clear how the jury is to take these payments into consideration.”  Id. 
182 Id. at 378–79.  Although unable to determine what the jury actually intended, the court 
found it more “plausible” that the trial court would be able to ascertain the jury’s intent 
than the appellate court.  Id.  Essentially, the court was advancing the policy of making the 
injured party whole over the stated purpose of the statute—to protect against double 
recovery.  Id. 
183 See supra notes 134–36 (describing the court’s attempt to decipher the jury’s intent and 
allocation of damages). 
184 See supra notes 121, 132 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s explanation 
that the statute’s purpose was to prevent double recovery). 
185 See supra note 129 and accompanying text (detailing how the injured party during trial 
informed the jury of his obligation to repay the worker’s compensation benefits). 
186 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting that the court explained that the 
Indiana subrogation statute specifically says, “from the amount received by the employee 
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This revolutionary interpretation by the Travelers court means that to 
protect their lien rights, and to contain costs, carriers will need to 
intervene in all third-party actions brought by injured workers.187  This 
contradicts the subrogation statute, which mandates that from any 
settlement or judgment, the carrier or employer shall receive “the 
amount of compensation paid to the employee or dependents.”188 
The subrogation statute subjects any recovery to set-off for the 
employer’s pro-rata share of the expenses incurred in the injured party’s 
action.189  It is contradictory to off-set the pro-rata share of expenses from 
the employer’s lien while at the same time requiring that the carrier 
assure enough evidence is presented to reserve its rights.190  Not only 
would intervention be contradictory, but also extremely inefficient.191  As 
the U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Alhorn, a good solution is to set up 
policies and procedures that outline the allocation of damages.192  By 
                                                                                                             
or dependent there shall be paid to the employer or the . . . carrier . . . amount of 
compensation paid to the employee” (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-13 (West 2005))). 
187 Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379.  Carriers only hope that the courts will interpret the 
“consider” language in the Collateral Source Statute in their favor is to intervene and argue 
their case in every third-party case brought by an injured employee.  See, e.g., id. 
188 § 22-3-2-13; see supra notes 74–76, 79, 82–85 (describing the purpose of Indiana’s 
subrogation statute); see also Gary L. Wickert, The Many Faces of Workers’ Compensation 
Subrogation, FINDLAW, http://library.findlaw.com/2006/Jul/7/246725.html (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2012) (“Indiana’s [subrogation] statute is “fairly straightforward . . . . [A]ny 
amount recovered . . . shall be paid to the employer/carrier in satisfaction of 
[their] . . . subrogation interest.”). 
189 § 22-3-2-13.  The code specifically states that any lien repaid is “subject to [the carrier] 
paying its pro-rata share of the reasonable and necessary costs and expenses of asserting 
the third party claim.”  Id.  Courts have held that even if the pro-rata share is not paid until 
the end, the lien is not waived.  E.g., Welter v. F.A. Wilhelm Constr., 743 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
190 See Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 658–59 
(7th Cir. 2006); Welter, 743 N.E.2d at 1259 (finding nothing had to be done before the lien 
should be repaid, holding the carriers’ liens are automatic).  Establishing an evidence 
threshold nullifies the pro-rata share set-off of the subrogation statute.  Schneider, 469 F.3d 
at 659–60. 
191 See State v. Mileff, 520 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (stipulating that the 
employer’s rights are what is supposed to be protected).  The court held that the employee, 
pursuant to the statute, is made the employer’s trustee, and that the employee is 
responsible for securing the lien rights for the employer.  Id.  By holding that the injured 
party is the carrier’s “trustee,” the courts have placed them with the burden of establishing 
the lien.  Id.  It would be an unnecessary waste of judicial resources and litigation expense 
to require the carrier to do the same thing that the injured party should already be doing.  
Id. 
192 See Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006) 
(explaining that failing to allocate leads to settlement manipulation).  The Court stipulated 
that states that have set up “special rules and procedures” for proceeds have circumvented 
such problems.  Id. at 288 n.18. 
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clarifying the language of the statute to mandate damages, the issues 
from the statute’s ambiguity would be eliminated. 
B. Collateral Source Statutes’ Ambiguity and Travelers Detrimental 
Interpretation 
Through the use of vague language and lack of burden allocation, 
the Collateral Source Statute leaves courts guessing as to its meaning, as 
demonstrated in the Travelers decision.193  The Travelers court interpreted 
the statute’s language, specifically the “consider[ation]” of evidence, to 
mean a carrier must meet an uncertain evidence standard.194  This 
burdens the judiciary, the subrogation statue, and the economy.  This 
decision has thus caused three problems:  (1) it undercuts the purpose of 
worker’s compensation and the subrogation statute; (2) the ambiguous 
language of the Collateral Source Statute allows for uncertain guess 
work and unpredictability in the allocation of damage awards; and (3) 
the Collateral Source Statute’s interpretation in Travelers undermines the 
collateral source rule’s purpose.195 
1. Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute as Interpreted in Travelers 
Undermines Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation System 
One of the main purposes of Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation Act 
is to reduce litigation costs.196  However, the Indiana Supreme Court in 
Travelers ignored stare decisis and concluded that the jury more likely 
protected the plaintiff’s interests, ignoring the stated purpose of 
protecting against a double recovery.197  This decision emphasizes a 
purpose that, although arguably important, is not one of the main 
purposes advanced by the state’s worker’s compensation system.198 
Almost all Indiana courts before the Travelers decision had upheld 
the notion that the employee was essentially the trustee of the 
                                                 
193 See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 377–78 (Ind. 2010) 
(explaining that the court was uncertain about the jury allocation of damages because of 
the Collateral Source Act’s ambiguous language). 
194 See supra notes 126–35 and accompanying text (describing the Indiana Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Indiana subrogation law). 
195 See infra Part III.B.1–3 (explaining in detail the problems respectively). 
196 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (quoting Indiana’s subrogation statute’s 
language).  “The purpose of the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Act is to avoid 
litigation . . . . [S]ections within it evidence a strong policy against allowing a double 
recovery.”  WICKERT, supra note 27, at 459 (footnotes omitted). 
197 See generally Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379 (finding for the injured party over the 
carrier’s lien rights). 
198 See supra notes 74–76, 79, 82–85 (describing the main purpose of the subrogation 
statute). 
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employer’s rights.199  This protection of employers’ interests is justified 
for several different reasons.  First, the employee receives a benefit from 
the faultless employer to compensate for damages resulting from the 
incident.200  It is conducive to public policy to reimburse the employer 
for an act that it did not contribute in causing.201  Second, the employer, 
pursuant to the subrogation statute, must repay its pro-rata share of all 
litigation expenses for the third-party action, thus eliminating any risk 
that the injured party would be disadvantaged by bringing the claim.202 
This long-standing protection is seen in the Schneider decision.203  
Reiterating past Indiana court decisions, the Schneider court found that 
the purpose of Indiana’s worker’s compensation subrogation statute was 
to protect the employer by providing them with compensation without 
further litigation.204  Utilizing past Indiana common law, the Schneider 
court emphasized two key themes:  (1) the subrogation statute is meant 
to eliminate unnecessary litigation; and (2) the central purpose is the 
protection and reimbursement of the employer.205  The Travelers decision 
deviates from the clear purpose of Indiana’s worker’s compensation case 
law.206  Although not explicitly saying that intervention is necessary to 
                                                 
199 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (holding that the employer’s lien rights 
were protected in the third-party actions litigated). 
200 Hogler, supra note 28, at 85–88.  In every state, under the specific state’s Worker’s 
Compensation Act, workers are entitled to collect from their employer’s medical benefits, 
regardless of the employer’s fault.  Id.  The Act sets up procedures and policies with the 
purpose of eliminating costly litigation for the employer.  Id. 
201 See Ingram, supra note 62, at 107–08 (explaining it would be against the purpose of 
subrogation to hold a faultless party responsible).  The doctrine of subrogation is based on 
principles of equity that mandate that the employer be reimbursed for its contribution 
when faultless.  Id. 
202 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining how Indiana is one of the few 
states that requires the employer/carrier to pay its fair share of all third-party litigation 
expenses). 
203 See Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., v. Nat’l Emp. Care Sys., Inc., 469 F.3d 654, 656–58, 
660 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the carrier’s lien rights were not waived because the carrier 
did not intervene and finding the settlement between the tortfeasor and the claimant 
invalid for failing to obtain the carrier’s consent). 
204 See generally id. at 658 (stipulating the twin purposes of the statute were to prevent 
double recovery and assure reimbursement). 
205 Id. 
206 See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. 2010) (refusing to 
recognize the carrier’s lien rights); see also supra note 177 and accompanying text (detailing 
Indiana cases that have interpreted Indiana worker’s compensation law and upholding lien 
rights).  The court in Travelers undermines these holdings by putting the injured 
employee’s rights first.  Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 379.  The court itself admits “the possibility 
that the jury included the amount of worker’s compensation payments made to Jarrells in 
its award based on its assumption that he would have to repay Travelers for those 
payments.”  Id. at 378.  The court goes on to justify its decision by stipulating that this 
outcome “is less likely” than the possibility that it was already included in the award.  Id. 
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protect a lien right, the Travelers court still abolishes any hope of an 
efficient solution to a third-party action.  A “successful conclusion” 
according to past Indiana cases, and their summation in Schneider, 
appeared to be one that was quick and efficient, affording the utmost 
protection to the employer/carrier liens.207  The court in Travelers aims 
for the opposite result, explicitly explaining that the ambiguity, and thus 
the lien, would have been granted to the carrier if it had intervened and 
clarified the rights for the jury.208  This is contrary to Indiana’s Worker’s 
Compensation Act’s purpose and stare decisis, which found the lien rights 
automatic under the subrogation statute.209  It was Indiana’s Collateral 
Source Statute’s ambiguous language that made this divergent decision 
possible. 
2. The Collateral Source Statute in Indiana Is Ambiguous and Unclear 
The Indiana Collateral Source Statute uses ambiguous language as to 
how payment evidence should be used in determining a damages 
award.  During the Travelers trial, pursuant to a pattern collateral source 
jury instruction, the jury was specifically instructed to consider 
repayment of worker’s compensation benefits into its award 
calculation.210  The instruction to the jury was based on the statute’s 
language, and yet the court still refused to honor the carrier’s lien due to 
uncertainty.211 
                                                 
207 Schneider, 469 F.3d at 659; see id. at 661 (upholding the carrier’s lien in accordance with 
Indiana law). 
208 See supra note 157 (stipulating that the lienholder could have protected its rights by 
intervening, so appearing to establish the intervention requirement for lien protection). 
209 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (noting that all previous Indiana court 
precedents have upheld this protection until the drastic change in Travelers, and there was 
no explanation in the court’s decision to explain the drastic change from prior precedent). 
210 Travelers, 927 N.E.2d at 377.  The pattern jury instruction given stated: 
If you find that Jerry Jarrells is entitled to recover, you shall consider 
evidence of payment made by some collateral source to compensate 
Jarrells for damages resulting from the accident in question.  In 
determining the amount of Jarrells’ damages, you must consider the 
following type of collateral source payments: 
 
Payments for worker’s compensation. 
 
In determining the amount received by Jarrells from collateral sources, 
you may consider any amount Jarrells is required to repay to a 
collateral source and the cost to Jarrells of collateral benefits received.  
Jarrells may not recover more than once for any item of loss sustained. 
Id. (citing INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL (MICHIE) 11.07 (2d ed. 
2007). 
211 See supra note 210 (quoting the language of the jury instruction given). 
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Providing clarity at trial goes against both active parties’ personal 
interests.212  Failing to inform the jury benefits both the injured party and 
the tortfeasor.213  This switch in interest protection contradicts the 
purpose of worker’s compensation, the tort reform movement, and 
subrogation statutes.214  Almost every prior Indiana decision, including 
Schneider, explicitly held that carriers are not required to engage in any 
sort of litigation to protect their rights; thus, the Travelers decision to 
implicitly hold that they are required to provide clarity—by interjecting 
into the action itself—is a bad policy and deviates from the purpose of 
worker’s compensation.215 
The main issue in Travelers was the meaning of the word “consider” 
in the Collateral Source Statute.216  The court was correct when it said 
“consider” is an ambiguous term because it can take on several different 
meanings.217  Both the Collateral Source Statute and the Travelers 
                                                 
212 See supra note 138 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the risk of 
settlement manipulation without clarification). 
213 See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text (describing how manipulation is 
promoted when the allocation of damages is uncertain). 
214 See supra Part II (explaining that a primary purpose of these three areas was to prevent 
double recovery). 
215 See supra Part III.A (describing how the interpretation of the Collateral Source 
Statute’s ambiguous language by the Travelers decision is an “upheaval” of the statute’s 
purpose). 
216 See Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jarrells, 927 N.E.2d 374, 377–78 (Ind. 2010) 
(explaining that the jury instruction of the use of the word “consider” could have been 
interpreted in two different ways:  either allocating the lien amount in the damages award 
or not). 
217 Id.  It is not a definitive standard that a jury can easily work with, as the statute simply 
states that “proof of payments . . . shall be considered by the trier of fact in arriving at the 
amount of any award.”  Id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-1 (West 2011).  The court explains: 
If the jury is to consider evidence of collateral source payments such as 
worker’s compensation that the plaintiff is required to repay, the only 
plausible interpretation of these provisions is that the jury should 
include the amount of any collateral source payments that the plaintiff 
is required to repay in its award to the plaintiff.  If, however, there is 
no evidence of an obligation to repay, then the jury should not include 
the amount of collateral source payments in its award.  The defendant, 
therefore, is benefited by evidence of the collateral source payments, 
and the plaintiff gets the benefit of proof of obligation to repay. 
Travelers, 927 N.E.2d. at 377. 
 The holding by the court does not make sense when applied to the facts of 
the trial, because at trial there was evidence that a lien would have to be repaid 
by Jarrells (the injured party).  So evidence was presented, but at no point in its 
decision does the court indicate how much evidence should have been 
presented, or how to secure the lien. 
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decision do little to provide clarity as to how juries should “consider” 
these payments in the future.218 
If Indiana’s subrogation statute is to operate effectively and 
guarantee the lien rights of carriers, as it was intended, the Collateral 
Source Statute must be amended.219  There are two proposed 
amendments discussed in Part IV, the first of which would reinstate the 
common law collateral source rule and remove the abrogation for 
worker’s compensation payments.220  This option would eliminate any 
possibility that the jury could misuse the information.221  The second 
option would adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent by 
mandating that worker’s compensation payments are included in the 
damages award.222 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
As explained in Part III, Indiana’s Collateral Source Act as presently 
written undermines the purpose of the state’s Worker’s Compensation 
Subrogation Act.223  The Collateral Source Act is meant to eliminate 
double recovery and reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits, yet its 
ambiguous language actually encourages them.224  Furthermore, the 
Collateral Source Act allows for contradictory interpretations, as seen in 
the Travelers decision.225  This Note proposes that to solve these 
problems, the Collateral Source Act must be amended in one of two 
ways:  Either the Act must be amended so that worker’s compensation 
payment evidence is no longer considered by the trier of fact, or the Act 
must be amended to remove the present ambiguity and mandate that 
worker’s compensation liens are included in the damages award.  Both 
solutions will revive the intention of Indiana’s Worker’s Compensation 
                                                 
218 Id. at 377–78.  The court just stipulates that the jury instruction should not be used 
again, but nothing in the decision sets out any future standard to be used. 
219 See infra Part IV. 
220 See infra Part IV (explaining that if the common law collateral source rule was 
reapplied to third-party actions, the risk of jury confusion and undermining the 
subrogation statute would be eliminated). 
221 See infra Part IV (describing how the payment evidence can easily confuse the jury 
when introduced). 
222 See supra Part II.B.4; see infra Part IV (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recommendation—to provide guidelines for juries to follow so uncertainty is removed 
from the damage award). 
223 See supra Part III (explaining that the purpose of the Collateral Source Act is to prevent 
against double recovery, yet the most recent interpretation allows for just that). 
224 See supra Part III (detailing arguments in support of collateral source rule revision). 
225 See supra Part II.D (describing various jurisdictions approach to abrogation of the 
collateral source rule and its impact on carrier subrogation rights).  
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Subrogation Act and reflect the Collateral Source Act’s original purpose 
of eliminating double recovery. 
A. Proposed Amendment to Section 34-44-1-2 of the Indiana Code 
The first proposal is to amend the Collateral Source Act to exclude 
worker’s compensation payments entirely.  This would remove the 
present abrogation and revive the common law collateral source rule for 
the consideration of worker’s compensation payments.226  The 
amendment would prevent the admittance of any payment evidence 
related to worker’s compensation payments, thus eliminating the need 
for the court to try to determine the jury’s assessment of such 
evidence.227  The proposed amended statute follows, with the Author’s 
commentary intertwined: 
 
Proposed Amendment to Indiana Code Section 34-44-1-2: 
In a personal injury or wrongful death action, the court 
shall allow the admission into evidence of: 
 (1) proof of collateral source payments other than: 
 (A) payments of life insurance or other death 
benefits; 
 (B) payments of worker’s compensation benefits; 
 (C) insurance benefits that the plaintiff or members 
of the plaintiff’s family have paid for directly; or 
 (C) payments made by: 
  (i) the state or the United States; or 
  (ii) any agency, instrumentality, or subdivision 
of the state or the United States; 
That have been made before trial to a plaintiff as 
compensation for the loss or injury for which the action 
is brought; 
(2) proof of the amount of money that the plaintiff is 
required to repay, including excluding worker’s 
compensation benefits, as a result of the collateral 
benefits received; and 
                                                 
226 See supra Part II.D.1 (explaining the common law collateral source rule and its bar on 
the introduction of third-party payments for injuries incurred). 
227 See supra Part II.D (discussing the courts’ uncertainty in determining the jury’s intent 
as to the allocation of the damages award). 
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(3) proof of the cost to the plaintiff or to members of the 
plaintiff’s family of collateral benefits received by the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff’s family.228 
Commentary 
This proposed amendment to section 34-44-1-2 of the Indiana Code 
makes the necessary changes to:  1) avoid uncertainty as to the jury’s 
consideration of worker’s compensation payment evidence; 2) eliminate 
any requirement to intervene in third-party actions to guarantee rights 
for carriers; and 3) revitalize the purpose of Indiana’s subrogation statute 
by once again protecting the worker’s compensation carrier’s lien rights. 
First, as explained previously, the main issue in Travelers was the 
court’s admitted inability to determine how the jury considered the lien 
repayment evidence presented at trial.229  This proposed amendment 
would remove that uncertainty and eliminate any unnecessary burden 
on the jury.  Under this approach, the jury would not be weighed down 
with the complications of worker’s compensation law or the complexity 
of a carrier’s lien—it would not even consider these issues.230 
Second, the elimination of the evidence requirement will make 
carrier intervention to guarantee rights unnecessary.  Due to the illogical 
precedent set by the Travelers decision and its contravention of worker’s 
compensation’s purpose, carriers currently have no guarantee that their 
liens will be protected without costly intervention.231  This is because no 
clear standard for lien preservation has been set by the Collateral Source 
Act or the Indiana Supreme Court.232  By eliminating the need for the 
presentation of worker’s compensation benefit repayment evidence, the 
burden on the interested parties, the court system, and the economy will 
be lifted.  Restoration of the common law rule in this area will prevent 
courts from setting evidentiary standards or thresholds, make claim 
outcomes more predictable, dramatically reduce litigation expenses, 
restore judicial efficiency, and save time.  Most importantly, the 
                                                 
228 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the Author. 
229 See supra Part II.D.1 (describing Indiana’s approach to collateral source rule 
abrogation in worker’s compensation cases).    
230 See supra Part II.D.1 (explaining that the court reasoned in Travelers that the lien was 
not included because of the lien’s complexity). 
231 See supra Part II.D.1 (explaining that one of the reasons subrogation is so rare is 
because of the complexity of determining the carrier’s lien amount). 
232 See supra Part III (demonstrating that the Travelers decision failed to set any standard 
to guarantee a lien for the carrier, and the Act’s ambiguous language forecloses the ability 
to gage a concrete standard). 
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Collateral Source Act’s purpose of reducing unnecessary litigation and 
expense will be realized.233 
Third, the restoration of the common law collateral source rule will 
restore the purpose of Indiana’s subrogation statute.234  The Act is meant 
to eliminate double recovery, like the Collateral Source Act, while 
protecting the interests of the carrier.235  It is vital that the carrier’s 
interests are protected because such protection affects the state’s overall 
economy.236  Employers in Indiana are required to carry worker’s 
compensation insurance, and when carriers’ costs increase, such as 
through litigation expenses to recover liens, premiums charged to 
employer businesses increase.237  Employers in Indiana have already 
experienced this hike in premiums, a cost that is most certainly 
transferred to consumers.238 
B. Proposed Mandate of Worker’s Compensation Liens in Damage Awards 
Although the previous recommendation to resort back to the 
common law collateral source rule for worker’s compensation payments 
is arguably the simpler solution, there is another alternative that will 
achieve the same result.  The second proposal is that if the Collateral 
Source Act is to be reformed at all, it should be rewritten to mandate that 
worker’s compensation payments are included in the damages award.  
This proposal would still remove all the risky guess work about the 
allocation of funds, eliminate the need for carriers to intervene to 
preserve their rights, and lower business and litigation costs, while 
preserving judicial efficiency.  Revision of Indiana’s Collateral Source 
Act section 34-44-2-3 follows: 
 In arriving at the amount of any award the trier of fact: 
 (1) must include in the award any payments that the 
plaintiff is statutorily required to repay to any third-parties; 
and 
                                                 
233 See supra Part II.D (describing the purposes behind Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute, 
which includes prevention against double recovery). 
234 See infra Part IV.A (describing how the common law collateral source rule will clear up 
any discrepancies in award allocation). 
235 See supra Part II.B (detailing how the subrogation statute is meant to protect the 
carrier’s interests and alleviate costs). 
236 See supra Part II.A (explaining that worker’s compensation insurance, as a multi-
billion dollar industry, is the largest insurance line in the nation). 
237 See supra notes 55–58, 161–64 and accompanying text (explaining the negative effect 
the increased claims have had on the economy during the recession). 
238 See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text (explaining that with no other way to 
recoup the costs, they get transferred to consumers). 
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 (2) other payment evidence not required to be repaid by 
the plaintiff may be considered by the trier of fact in arriving 
at the award amount and shall be considered by the court in 
reviewing award that are alleged to be excessive.239 
Commentary 
This second proposed amendment appeals to collateral source rule 
reformers, who worry that without evidence of third-party payments, 
the plaintiff stands to receive a windfall.240  This option also gives the 
jury the “whole picture” as to third-party benefits, allowing them to 
make a more informed decision and ensuring a more accurate damage 
award.  At the same time, this option protects the lien holder’s 
subrogation rights by mandating that the payments are included in the 
award.  Since more evidence must be presented under this proposal, it 
may be less judicially efficient, but given that this solution appeals to 
both sides of the tort reform movement, it may be worth the additional 
time and effort. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Worker’s compensation insurance is a multi-billion dollar industry 
in the United States and, as such, is an integral part of Indiana’s 
economy.  It is vital to Indiana’s economy that the integrity of the 
worker’s compensation system be protected.  To ensure such protection, 
carriers’ liens must continue to be judicially recognized and enforced.  
The Indiana Supreme Court flouted previous case law and undermined 
the state’s worker’s compensation system by denying worker’s 
compensation carriers statutorily enumerated lien rights in the Travelers 
decision.  This decision was attributed to the Collateral Source Act’s 
ambiguous language, which, as currently written, leaves the door open 
for double recovery, a phenomenon the Act was meant to prevent. 
The ambiguity in Indiana’s Collateral Source Statute leads to 
detrimental results that contradict the statute’s purpose of preventing 
double recovery.  To restore this purpose, the ambiguity in Indiana’s 
Collateral Source Act must be replaced with a concrete standard that 
protects all parties’ interests.  Either the consideration of worker’s 
compensation payments should be prohibited by returning to the 
common law collateral source rule for the consideration of such 
payments or juries should be mandated to include any lien in the 
                                                 
239 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the Author. 
240 See supra Part II.C (describing the recent tort reform movement, which has grown 
because of a desire to reduce costs and frivolous lawsuits). 
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damages award.  Both of these solutions would restore the prevention of 
double recovery, promote judicial efficiency by eliminating the implicit 
requirement of intervention for lien protection, and reduce business 
costs.  The concrete standards proposed would guide the courts and 
protect the integrity of Indiana’s worker’s compensation system while 
helping to revitalize Indiana’s economy, an outcome where everyone 
benefits. 
Jamie R. Kauther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